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16 November 2026
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bulgaria

Bulgaria's Unfair Trading Practices Prohibition in Action – the Commission on Protection of Competition's Kaufland Decision

In a recent decision[1], the Bulgarian Commission on the Protection of Competition (the "CPC") found that Kaufland Bulgaria EOOD & Co. KD had committed three separate infringements of the general prohibition on unfair trading practices in the agricultural and food supply chain. The proceedings concerned the company's dealings with suppliers of milk and dairy products, as well as meat and meat products, and resulted in the imposition of fines totalling EUR 75,653,706.



[1] CPC Decision No. 1110 of 5 November 2026.

This is the first decision of the CPC following the latest amendments to the Competition Protection Act (the "CPA") related to unfair trading practices. Transposing Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain (the "Directive") through amendments to the CPA[1], the provisions introduced in Chapter Seven "b" of the CPA aim to address significant imbalances in bargaining power between suppliers and buyers of agricultural and food products. Subsequent amendments[2] in Chapter Seven "b" introduce a general prohibition on unfair trading practices that covers any act or omission by a buyer that is contrary to good commercial practice and harms or may harm the supplier's interests. Further amendments to the CPA[3] amended and supplemented Chapter Seven "b" by adding 20 new categories of prohibited conduct to the absolute prohibitions on unfair trading practices under Article 37b.

In view of the above, the CPC decision is significant not merely for the sanctions imposed, but for the substantive standard it develops. Its central themes are the lack of objective justification for financial burdens and the imbalance in buyer-supplier relationships, including stronger bargaining position. The CPC examined how the buyer's stronger negotiating position was used to transfer costs and risks, whether suppliers received a proportionate benefit, and whether the terms were transparent and genuinely negotiable.

The general prohibition and good commercial practice

The CPC's focus is on the general prohibition on unfair trading practices and on assessing infringements. It interprets the general prohibition set out in the opening limb of Article 37b(1) of the CPA broadly, emphasising that the assessment of whether an infringement has occurred should not be limited to determining whether the conduct in question constitutes one of the unfair trading practices expressly listed in the CPA. Instead, the assessment should also take into account the concept of "good commercial practice", as defined in the CPA. According to the CPC, such an assessment should consider three interrelated criteria: compliance with the law, consistency with customary commercial relations, and conformity with accepted principles of morality.

Importantly, the CPC distinguishes between customary practice and good commercial practice, noting that a departure from an established commercial model does not inherently demonstrate unfairness, just as a well-established practice does not become fair simply because it is widespread or longstanding. Ultimately, the CPC is looking at the harm, or a risk of harm, to the supplier's interests, assessing whether the contractual relationship between the buyer and the supplier is based on fair dealing, predictability and mutual respect for the parties' rights and legitimate interests, and whether negotiations are conducted in accordance with the principle of freedom of contract.

Price "improvements": justification and genuine freedom to negotiate

The first infringement concerned annual requests for "improvements" in purchasing terms, implemented through reductions in suppliers' delivery prices. The CPC identified a common model applied to the seven suppliers examined, whereby annual reductions accumulated despite declining supplier turnover within the chain, improving the buyer's profitability at the suppliers' expense. Its assessment was based on two interrelated considerations: the absence of objective justification and the lack of genuine freedom to negotiate.

The CPC has established that the supplier is required to assume the financial burden; the only matter open to negotiation is the amount of that burden, not whether the supplier may genuinely refuse the requested "improvement" in the first place. According to the decision, some suppliers even explained that they were unable to grant the requested reductions, including due to the deterioration of their financial results, yet ultimately agreed following prolonged negotiations and the buyer's persistent insistence. In the CPC's view, the signing of the agreements, especially in such circumstances, did not establish free and equal bargaining; rather, it indicated the opposite. The suppliers' dependence on the chain and their limited alternative sales channels constrained their ability to reject or change the proposed terms.

Next, the CPC found that the retail chain failed to provide a proper and objective justification for the "improvements", or to demonstrate that the financial burden is proportionate to proven benefits for the supplier. Ultimately, the expansion of Kaufland's retail network was found to primarily benefit the chain itself, as it creates opportunities for increased sales of all the products it offers.

The CPC found that Kaufland's conduct in its dealings with its suppliers, both generally and specifically in relation to the identified unfair trading practices, takes place against a backdrop of a significant imbalance in bargaining power in favour of the retail chain. Having regard to the overall economic and factual context in which the arrangements were concluded, notwithstanding the parties' formal assertion that they had reached an agreement, the CPC concluded that where the economically stronger party in the negotiations imposes terms that are not, in substance, the result of negotiations conducted on an equal footing, the suppliers' acceptance of those terms cannot be regarded as an exercise of contractual freedom, but rather as a consequence of its restriction.

In view of the above, the CPC found that Kaufland infringed the general prohibition in the opening limb of Article 37b(1) CPA by requiring reductions in delivery prices when negotiating commercial terms for 2026.

Converting service fees into permanent price reductions: the importance of transparency

The second infringement concerned the conversion or restructuring of remuneration for services provided by Kaufland into permanent reductions in delivery prices. While the CPC acknowledges that discounts and net pricing are ordinary commercial mechanisms and therefore not inherently unfair, it is the particular restructuring of these arrangements that it considered to constitute unfair trading practice. More specifically, through that restructuring, the buyer retained the economic value of the former service fees, while the corresponding services ceased to exist as separately identifiable contractual obligations.

The distinction drawn by the CPC is both legal and economic. According to the CPC, the delivery price constitutes consideration for the acquisition of the goods, whereas a service fee remunerates specific activities performed by the buyer in the supplier's interest. Ancillary services, including advertising, are found to be a common feature of the relationship between retail chains and their suppliers, and may be permissible where their terms, scope and value are clearly and unambiguously agreed, with the value based on objective and reasonable assessments. Under the model examined by the CPC, the amounts previously attributable to specific services were absorbed into a single pricing mechanism, thereby losing their separate contractual basis.

Once again, as in the case of the first infringement, the CPC found that the negotiations between Kaufland and its suppliers lacked genuine bargaining and equality. This was evidenced by the absence of any proposals to amend the substance of the services, as well as of specific arguments justifying their discontinuation, such as increased volumes, advertising activities undertaken or benefits for suppliers. At the same time, the change or restructuring was introduced in such a way that the buyer retained the economic benefit, while the corresponding service obligation was eliminated. It was further found that suppliers continued to provide the same value through lower prices, without being able to establish the services due, verify their scope and value, demand performance or hold the buyer contractually accountable. The reduction applied to subsequent deliveries irrespective of the services actually performed, giving the buyer a lasting price advantage without an equivalent agreed benefit for the suppliers.

The central concern is therefore the loss of transparency, and the supplier's interests being adversely affected, along with the inability to verify whether the discount granted corresponds to the benefit received in return, the inability to assess economic efficiency and return on investment, and the inability to make an objective assessment of the profitability of the relationship with the particular buyer. In addition, the CPC found that the basis for the payment was altered, blurring the distinction between price and service, and making it impossible to trace the link between the economic value provided by the supplier and the specific commercial purpose justifying its provision. It is precisely this conduct that both jeopardises and directly harms suppliers' economic interests, as, according to the CPC, they could no longer determine what they were receiving in exchange for the reduction or assess the profitability of the relationship.

In view of the above, the CPC found that Kaufland's conduct constituted bad faith conduct in breach of the general prohibition on unfair trading practices.

Obstacles to supplier-requested price increases

The third infringement concerned unjustified obstacles to requests by suppliers for higher delivery prices. The CPC examined delayed responses, additional requirements towards suppliers, prolonged waiting periods and inaction that postponed the negotiation or implementation of substantiated increases, without identified technical or other objective impediments.

The CPC established that, in the course of the buyer-supplier relationship, suppliers are the parties seeking price increases, have economic justification for such increases, and take the initiative in requesting them from the buyer. That said, the CPC found that, although Kaufland maintains that suppliers may request price increases for the products they supply at any time, such requests often resulted in nothing more than the discontinuation of products supplies. Where prices were eventually adjusted, the increases where, in most cases, lower than those sought by the supplier, took place much later or did not materialise at all.

The CPC assessed Kaufland's stated objective as a buyer, namely, to safeguard consumers' purchasing power and the affordability of goods on the shelves. However, the CPC found that either this objective is not being adequately pursued or the buyer has no intention of achieving it. It established that, despite the imposition and maintenance of low purchase prices paid to suppliers, these were not only not reflected in retail prices. On the contrary, retail prices for some products even increased while delivery prices remained unchanged. Accordingly, in the circumstances examined, the alleged benefit to consumers did not justify the conduct in question, as the resulting benefit accrued to the buyer's financial performance rather than preserving consumers' purchasing power.

In light of the foregoing, the CPC found that Kaufland Bulgaria had engaged in conduct that created unjustified obstacles to suppliers seeking to negotiate price increases, thereby infringing the first limb of Article 37b(1) of the CPA.  

Fine imposed

Based on an overall assessment of the retail chain's conduct, the CPC classified the established unfair trading practices as an infringements that are "not particularly serious".

The decision is subject to appeal before the Administrative Court – Sofia Region within 14 days of its notification to the parties.



[1] Amendments, published in State Gazette No. 17 of 26 February 2021, effective from 1 November 2021.

[2] Amendments to Chapter Seven "b", published in State Gazette No. 95 of 7 November 2025.

[3] Amendments published in State Gazette No. 58 of 26 June 2026 and effective from that date.

Author: Yoana Strateva

Yoana
Strateva

Attorney at Law

bulgaria