to the point: White Collar Crime Law in CEE 2/2026

(i) On substantial aspects

Austrian Supreme Court, 13 January 2026, 14Os108/25a (fraudulent insolvency – concealment of income in debt settlement proceedings)

The case concerns the offence of fraudulent insolvency under Section 156(1) and (2) of the Austrian Criminal Code (StGB), involving the concealment of income totalling EUR 556,466 received as disguised profit distributions during pending personal debt-settlement proceedings. A key legal question concerned whether the concealment of income in debt-settlement proceedings constitutes a "real" reduction of assets under Section 156 StGB where corresponding liabilities are simultaneously reduced.

The Supreme Court dismissed the nullity complaint, confirming the conviction. It held that the concealment of income in debt-settlement proceedings satisfies the element of apparent asset reduction regardless of whether the assets were subsequently actually diminished, since the act of concealment itself is the relevant conduct. The court did, however, flag a sentencing error for the Court of Appeal's attention: the trial court had treated the offence as fully completed but failed to make the concrete findings on actual creditor detriment required to exclude the mitigating factor under Section 34(1)(13) StGB.

Austrian Supreme Court, 20 January 2026, 15Os143/25f (nullity complaint; sentencing provisions; confiscation order)

The defendant challenged the conviction of embezzlement through a nullity complaint pursuant to Section 281(1)(11) of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, claiming that the court acted in violation of sentencing provisions.

The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that his sentence was disproportionate to that imposed on another employee convicted of similar conduct, finding no impermissible violation of the sentencing provisions. It also dismissed the challenge to the confiscation order, ruling that the defendant's assertion that he gave the money to friends rather than using it himself did not raise a valid legal issue.

Higher Regional Court Innsbruck, 6Bs174/25a, 21 January 2026 (corruption – "climate cultivation" by a political association)

Two related decisions concern (i) the offences of accepting advantages to exert influence under Section 306(1) StGB and granting advantages to exert influence under Section 307b(1) StGB, as well as (ii) the association's liability under the VbVG, arising from the repeated payment of a public official's annual Christmas parties by a political association between 2013 and 2018. Under both provisions, intent to influence a public official's future conduct – even without a link to a specific act – is sufficient; what is required is the so-called intent of "Klimapflege" (cultivation of goodwill).

Both appellate courts dismissed all appeals and confirmed the convictions in full, finding that the evidence comprehensively supported both the external facts and the subjective intent. The courts noted that the opaque manner in which the association's sponsorship of the parties was handled – not disclosed to attendees – was itself a significant indicator of the intent to influence. As regards sentencing, the courts declined to impose unconditional fines, finding that the extensive public and media scrutiny of the proceedings had in itself produced a sufficient general deterrent effect and noting that the defendants had since left public office.

Higher Regional Court Linz, 23 December 2025, 7Bs143/25s (fraud – suretyship obtained by deception from foundation)

The decision concerns the offence of aggravated fraud under Sections 146, 147(1)(1) and (3) StGB, in connection with an indictment challenge under Section 212(1) StPO, arising from the allegedly fraudulent procurement of a EUR 600,000 suretyship from a private foundation. Under Section 212(1) StPO, proceedings are to be terminated only if the facts alleged – hypothetically assumed to be proved – cannot be subsumed under any criminal offence.

The court dismissed the indictment challenge, rejecting the argument that fraud cannot be committed where the person deceived was not formally authorised to make the relevant legal transaction. It confirmed that fraud, as a self-harm offence, does not require the deceived person's disposition to have been legally valid under civil law – it is the factual disposition that matters. As regards the evidence, the foundation's founder exercised de facto control over the foundation's decisions and the court found it amply established that he had made the relevant disposition in substance, with the board members merely giving legal effect to his will.

(ii) On procedural aspects

Austrian Supreme Court, 7 January 2026, 13Os123/25z (seizure of data; journalistic privilege)

The decision revolves around the requirements for the seizure of data carriers and data in accordance with Sections 115f and 115l of the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO), in particular the requirement for prior authorisation from the Legal Protection Officer (Rechtsschutzbeauftragter) pursuant to Section 115l(1) third sentence StPO. In addition, Section 157(1)(4) StPO and Section 31 of the Media Act are central, granting media owners a thematic right to refuse to give evidence in order to protect journalistic sources and entrusted documents.

The Vienna Court of Appeal had overturned the seizure of data carriers and data from a media owner suspected of terrorism because it considered authorisation from the Legal Protection Officer to be necessary "without exception" – even for data not of an informational nature within the meaning of Section 157(1)(4) StPO. The Supreme Court clarified that the authorisation requirement applies only to information in respect of which the journalist or media owner would be entitled to refuse to testify as a witness, and not to data that is not covered by confidentiality. It further held that confidentiality protection does not apply where the professional bound by confidentiality is themselves a primary suspect; in such circumstances, authorisation from the Legal Protection Officer is required only for specific investigative measures expressly provided for by statute.

Austrian Supreme Court, 20 January 2026, 15Os133/25k (nullity complaint; right to a fair trial)

According to Section 262 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO), a court is obliged to inform defendants of any changes to the legal classification of the charges in the course of the trial.

The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court violated Section 262 StPO by convicting the defendant as an instigator rather than as a direct perpetrator as originally charged, without adequately informing him of the change. This procedural defect prejudiced the defendant's ability to mount an appropriate defence, as the factual allegations supporting the altered characterisation differed substantially from those in the original indictment. The Court consequently annulled all convictions, the sentence, forfeiture order and civil adhesion ruling, remanding the case for a new trial.

(i) On substantial aspects

Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, File No. 5 Tdo 766/2024 (subsidy fraud; damage to the financial interests of the EU; unauthorised use of EU funds)

Under Section 260(2) of the Criminal Code, anyone who unlawfully uses financial resources originating from the budget of the European Union or property acquired from such budgets is liable to prosecution.

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal of the defendant, a municipal mayor who had obtained a subsidy for a project involving the reconstruction of a building and purchase of equipment intended to provide social services to socially excluded communities. The defendant failed to ensure that the subsidy was used for its stated purpose, did not inform the provider, and instead submitted documents containing false information asserting that the required services were being provided. 

The Supreme Court held that unauthorised use of financial resources within the meaning of Section 260(2) of the Criminal Code refers to conduct resulting in expenditure from European budgets for purposes other than those intended, or property acquired from such budgets being used other than as intended – even if the alternative use was generally beneficial or did not provide the perpetrator with any financial gain. Unauthorised use may also be inferred where the purpose for which the financial resources or property were used is not established, where it is clear they were not used for the designated purpose, or where they were not used at all.

Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, File No. 8 Tz 20/2025 (tax evasion; criminal liability of legal entities; attribution of crimes to legal entities)

Under Section 8(1) of the Corporate Criminal Liability Act (CCLA), a criminal offence committed by a legal entity is an unlawful act committed in its interest or within the scope of its activities by, among others, a statutory body or a member of a statutory body.

The Supreme Court ruled on an appeal by the Minister of Justice filed in favour of the accused legal entity, which had been found guilty of tax evasion under Section 240(1) and (2)(c) of the Criminal Code. The company's chairman of the board had fraudulently claimed VAT deductions based on fictitious invoices from a shell company, causing damage of CZK 1,365,000 through unlawful reduction of tax liability.

The Supreme Court held that the law had been violated to the detriment of the accused legal entity. The Court found that the criminal offence was committed to conceal other conduct undertaken against the interests of the legal entity for the purely personal benefit of its statutory body – specifically, the chairman of the board had withdrawn more than CZK 5m in cash from the company's account for purposes that were not in the company's interest.

The Supreme Court emphasised that where conduct was essentially committed against the interests of the legal entity or even to its detriment, the criminal liability of such a harmed legal entity cannot be inferred and only the criminal liability of the acting person will apply. This applies even though the formal conditions under Section 8(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the CCLA would otherwise be met.

(i) On substantial aspects

Appellate Court in Belgrade, Special Department for Organised Crime, Kž1-Po1 13/25 (apparent joinder of offences – forgery subsumed in abuse of position)

In the decision, the Court clarified the treatment of apparent joinder of offences between abuse of official position and forgery of a document. The Court held that, in the circumstances of the case, the drafting of an official record containing false information did not constitute a separate offence of document forgery but rather formed an integral act of execution of the offence of abuse of official position.

The Court applied the doctrine of apparent ideal joinder of offences (consumption), holding that forgery of documents (Article 355(2) in conjunction with Article 355(1)) was subsumed within abuse of official position (Article 359(1)) as the more complex offence, since the forgery constituted the method of execution and caused the more serious harm to third parties.

(ii) On procedural aspects

Appellate Court in Belgrade, Special Department for Organised Crime, Kž-Po1-Po1 4/25 (temporary seizure of criminal proceeds – evidentiary standards)

In assessing the request for temporary seizure, the Court applied the "obvious disproportion" test between lawful income and asset value. The Court emphasised that no evidence was submitted to substantiate the lawful origin of the seized funds, dismissing allegations that the funds were generated from leasing inherited real estate, as they were unsupported by any documentary evidence, such as lease agreements or other records capable of demonstrating the existence and value of such rental income.

For loan agreements submitted to justify the origin of assets, the court held that the agreements alone are insufficient to prove actual fund transfers; corroborating evidence of the lender's capacity to provide the loan, as well as some form of paper trail, is required. The Court further held that intercepted communications discussing methods to "wash" money through invoices and business transactions were admissible as evidence of the funds' criminal origin.

Appellate Court in Belgrade, Special Department for Organised Crime, Kž1-Po1 17/25 (statute of limitations for continuing offences)

In its decision, the Court held that the statute of limitations for continuing offences must be calculated from the last action of the continuing offence, not from each individual act.

The Court reasoned that, where the defendant concluded transactions on the same day as the account blockage caused by the first promissory note, this demonstrated a unified intent to obtain maximum unlawful gain, confirming the continuing nature of the offence and precluding limitation from running on the individual acts.

ECtHR, 17 February 2026, 6580/22 (covert informers – inadequate convention safeguards)

The case concerned regulations issued in 2008 and amended in 2018, which allow Bulgaria's State Agency for National Security to infiltrate informers (known as "agents on cover") into private entities or as members of a "liberal profession". Such agents conceal that they are working for the Agency but are not allowed to use covert surveillance techniques or equipment and are considered different from undercover agents (known as "agents under cover").

The Court found, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 8. The regulations fell short of the minimum safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse required under Article 8: deployment was triggered merely by a vaguely defined "proven operational need" with no requirement for clear and concrete reasons in individual cases and no effective scrutiny of the Agency's decision. The Agency's tasks spanned an exceptionally broad range of domains – meaning that theoretically any individual or private organisation in Bulgaria could be placed under surveillance – while no time limits, no effective supervision mechanism and no remedy against unlawful deployment existed. The domestic provisions therefore failed to meet the quality-of-law requirement and could not justify the interference with Article 8 rights as being "necessary in a democratic society".

ECJ, 29 January 2026, C-291/24 (AML sanctions – corporate liability without prior natural person conviction)

The case concerns the interpretation of Articles 58(1–3), 59(1) and 60(5–6) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. The key question, referred to the ECJ by Austria's Federal Administrative Court, was whether those provisions – read in light of the principle of effet utile – preclude national rules that require, as a condition for sanctioning a legal person, that a specific natural person must first have been formally designated as an accused, named in the operative part of the penalty decision, and found to have committed an unlawful and culpable breach attributable to the legal entity.

The Court held that Article 60(5) and (6) of Directive 2015/849 merely identifies the categories of natural persons whose conduct can trigger the liability of a legal person but does not require that those natural persons first be found personally liable under national law or named in the operative part of the decision imposing a sanction on the legal entity. Making the sanction of a legal person contingent on a prior finding of individual natural-person liability would undermine the effectiveness and deterrent character of the sanctions that the Directive directly imposes on obliged entities. The Court therefore found that the Austrian procedural requirements at issue are incompatible with EU law, while confirming that the three-year prosecution limitation period and five-year penalty limitation period under Austrian law are, in principle, consistent with EU law.